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INSURANCE-INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE-FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH
REINSTATEMENT-Plaintiff sued for clisability benefits under a life insurance
policy providing that it should be incontestable from its date and that insured's
statements, in the absence of fraud, should be deemed representations and would
not avoid the policy unless contained in a written application, a copy of which
was attached to the policy when issued. Defendant sought to rescind the contract on the ground that a reinstatement granted some eighteen months before
had been induced by fraudulent statements. Held, the reinstatement may be
contested only within the time after reinstatement fixed for contesting the policy,
and that fraud is not excluded from the operation of the incontestable clause.
Johnson v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., (N.D. 1945) 17 N.W. (2d) 337.
. While judicial sanction has been given to an incontestable clause in insurance contracts which provides for a reasonable period of contestability, on the
theory of a contractural short statute of limitations,1 the related problems before
the court in the principal case are the subjects of greater controversy. The
power to reinstate a lapsed policy is derived from the contract, and its relation
to the incontestable clause found in the policy rests upon the terms of the contract. Usually, the policy is silent in this respect; and, where the clause provides for a period of contestability, the resort to construction has led, in the
examined cases, to a variety of results. The view that reinstatement does not
fall within the scope of the incontestable clause, and that it may be contested
at any time, finds some support in the absence of any compelling language in
the policy. 2 Others have compromised this result by permitting a contest of the
reinstatement only if the contestable period calculated from the date of issue
has not expired. 3 The opposite result has been reached by one line of cases which

2d ed., 818 ( 1930).
"That which is continued or restored is the original policy. The incontestability
clause speaks from the date of the original policy, and relates to matters connected with
the issuance of the original policy. The new contract for the reinstatement of the
policy, like any other contract, may be attacked for fraud." New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Feicht, (D.C. Ill. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 318 at 320. See also: Alper v. New York
Life Ins. Co., (D.C. Ill. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 956; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 27
Ala. App. 113, 168 S. 200 (1936).
8 "So, in the instant case the reinstatement created no new contract, but revived
the original to the same extent as if there had been no lapse. This rendered incon._1-VANcE, INSURANCE,
2
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subscribe to the theory that a reinstatement is a new insurance contract incorporating all the terms of the old policy, necessarily causing the period of contestability to run anew from the date of reinstatement. 4 A final class of authorities, which has the support of distinguished writers,~ reaches the same result
but on the theory that reinstatement revives the lapsed policy. These courts
impute a reasonable intent to the parties that the clause shall apply equally to any
new defenses that arise from the reinstatement. 6 This latter view subserves the
public interest recognized in statutes of limitations. The problem when, as in the
principal case, the incontestable clause operates from date of issue has not been
before the courts directly. This court holds that the clause applies to the reinstatement by constructive intent of the contractors, relying on cases that have
taken this view when the clause specified a reasonable period of contestability.
Those cases, however, were expressive of the public policy underlying incontestability after a specified reasonable period, while incontestability from date
bears no analogy to a statute of limitations. The court's failure to give weight to
the distinction between the two types of clauses places the principal case in an
anomolous position. While expressly rejecting the authorities that would preclude a contest of the reinstatement before the insurer had a reasonable opportunity to investigate the statements made during negotiations, characterizing
them as an invitation to fraud, the case reaches the same result. The vital difference between a clause specifying a contestable period and one barring defenses from its date is acutely presented when efforts are made to include fraud
within the operation of the clause. 7 That fraud defeats a contract is fundamental. 8
Yet, where the policy is made incontestable after a specified time, and fraud is
not excepted in express terms from the operation of the clause, it is barred as a
testable clause available and certainly, since more than two years has elapsed . ; . , this
clause is effectual to waive all defenses except the ones reserved in the contract-namely,
the nonpayment of premiums." Illinois Bankers' Life Assn. v. Hamilton, 188 Ark.
887 at 894, 67 S.W. (2d) 741 (1934). Accord: Massachusetts Benefit Life Assn. v.
Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 30 S.E. 918 (1898); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy, 203
Ala. 452, 83 S. 591 (1919).
4
Teeter v. United Life & Accident Ins. Assn, 42 N.Y.S. 119 (1896), affirmed,
159 N.Y. 411, 54 N.E. 72 (1899); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galbraith, Il5
Tenn. 471, 91 S.W. 204 (1905); McCormack v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 220
N.Y. 447, n6 IN.E. 74 (1917).
5
I APPLEMAN, INs. L. & P. 374 (1941); VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d. ed., 826
(1930).
6
"We think the fair construction is that the incontestable clause took fresh
effect when the policy again came into force by the reinstatement, and that the right
to contest because of fraud in the reinstatement would expire two years after that
date. This conclusion cannot rest upon any precise language in the policy; but it is the
reasonable inference as to what the parties intended by reinstating a policy containing
this clause, and also providing, in effect, that liability should be defeated by showing
fraud in the reinstatement application." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Seymour, (C.C.A.
6th, 1930) 45 F. (2d) 47 at 49. On incontestability of reinstatement generally, see,
94 A.L.R. 1200 (1935).
7
6 A.L.R. 452 (1920); 13 A.L.R. 675 (1921); 35 A.L.R. 1492 (1925).
8
VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 828 (1930).
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defe'nse. 9 Whether the right to defend on grounds of fraud may be contracted
away absolutely is doubtful. One line of cases has held forcefully that a general
incontestable clause from date of issue is invalid as regards fraud on the ground
that it contravenes public policy.10 The opposite result has been roundly criticized,11 but has been reached by a few courts.12 T~is latter view is founded
principally on two cases, Patterson v. Natural Premium Mutual Life Ins. Co. 13
and Insurance Co. v. Fox. 14 In, the Patterson case, apparently, the defense of
fraud was not pressed earnestly, and its pronouncements on this point are dictum.
In the Fox. case, the issue was decided squarely, but the reasoning is attenuated;
the logic of a short statute of limitations was misconstrued to give the parties
the right to waive a defense of fraud. 15 The principal case reaffirms this court's
former expressic_:ms of policy with regard to fraud, 16 and approves the principle
of the majority holding, but again fails to emphasize the controlling difference
between incontestability after a specified time and incontestability from date.17
9 "It [ the incontestable clause] is not a stipulation absolute to waive all defenses and to condone fraud. On the contrary, it recognizes fraud and all other defenses but it provides ample time and opportunity within which they may be, but
beyond which they• may not be,· established. It is in the nature of and serves a similar
purpose as statutes of limitations and repose, the wisdom of which is apparent to all reasonable minds." Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Assn., I 18 N.Y. z37 at 243, z3 N.E.
186 (1?90). Accord: Great Western Life Ins. Co. v. Snavely, (C.C.A. 9th, 1913) 206
F. 20; Dibble v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 199, 149 P. 171 (1915); Plotner
v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 48 N.D. 295, 183 N.W. 1000 (1921).
·
10 "Will the court enforce an agreement never to set up fraud in defence to a
contract, when the contract is made in reliance upon material representations that
:inay be true or false? This question has been considered in its application to contracts
of insurance. In Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 EI. & Bl. 23z at z83, Lord Campbell interpreted a provision that a contract should be indefensible, as meaning indisputable,
'subject to the implied exceptions of personal fraud which will vitiate every contract.'"
Reagan v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 555 at 557, 76 N.E. z17 (1905).
See also: Massachusetts Benefit Life Assn. v. Robinson, 104 Ga. z56, 30 S.E. 918
(1898).
11 "Indefensible," 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., zz8on ( I<}36) ; 17 VA.
L. REG. 1 (191z).
12 Duvall v. National Life Ins. Co., z8 Idaho 356, 154 P. 63Z (1916); MacKendree v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 112 S.C. 335, 99 S.E. 806 (1919).
13 100 Wis. n8, 75 N.W. 980 (1898).
14 106. Tenn. 347, 61 S.W. 6z (1901).
15 "If the time may be limited to one year within which the defense of fraud
may ·be made available, it is difficult to see why it may not be limited to six months
or one month, or such other time less than this as the ·company may deem it important
to stipulate. If fraud may be waived at all, certainly the parties may stipulate grounds
upon which the :waiver may be made. • . . " Insurance Co.v. Fox, 106 Tenn. 347
at 353, 61.s.w. 6z (1901).
16 Speaking of applicatio:q for reinstatement, it was said, "The insured owed the
company the same good faith which he had a right to demand of the company."
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 71 N.D. 383 at 393, 2 N.W. (zd) 163 (1941).
17 Plotner v. Northwestern' National Life Ins. Co., 48 N.D. z95 at 304, 183
N.W. 1000 (19z1), where the North Dakota court has given express attention to the
distinction between incontestability from date and after a period.
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In lending its weight to the minority view, this court departs from the principle
of a short statut~ of limitations, and places the entire risk of fair dealing in
reinstatement on the insurer. The clause making the policy in the principal
case incontestable from date of issue is required by statute, but no language in
the policy is determinative of the relation between this clause and reinstatement.
Both application of incontestability to reinstatement, and exceptions to its operation, rest in the presumed intent of the parties. Might not the parties have intended that fraud inducing a reinstatement remain available as a defense until
a reasonable period for investigation had expired? Strict adherence to the principle upon which incontestability clauses find favor in the law would seem to
demand this construction.

T. M. Kubiniec

